What it measures

Log of tangible book equity (ceqt) over market equity matched at FYE

Why it should work

Valuation: stocks that look cheap relative to fundamentals (earnings, book value, sales, cash flow) have historically out-earned expensive ones.

Full Sharpe
0.31
Ann. Return (LS)
7.7%
Ann. Volatility
24.6%
Max Drawdown
-77.0%

Growth of $1 — long-short

Technology only · cap-weighted · 329 months

Technology only
Where the edge comes from
Long leg Sharpe
0.58
top bucket, long-only
Long leg ann. return
19.2%
the buyable side
Bottom bucket Sharpe
0.43
the basket we short
Bottom bucket ann. return
11.5%
lower ⇒ wider spread

The bottom-bucket figures are that basket’s ownreturn (a long position in what the strategy shorts) — not the short side’s P&L. Long-short return = long leg − bottom bucket, so a falling bottom bucket widens the spread.

Performance by period
train
val
test
Sharpe by split
Train ’00–’120.49
Val ’13–’180.19
Test ’19–’260.20
Test FF5 α (ann.)
6.0%
alpha vs Fama-French 5
Test FF5 α t-stat
0.49
not significant
Monthly turnover
12%
of the long leg, per rebalance

Source study

Stattman · 1980

Other

1,555 citations
View on Google Scholar

Worked example

Live inputs for a real holding

AAPL · July 2026
InputValue
equity106,491,000,000$
intangibles21,334,000,000$
me report3,725,927$M
Formula
log((equity - intangibles) / me_report)
Raw10.0369Signed (×+1)10.0369

signed_value is the internal ranking value; only its cross-sectional rank matters. $-vs-$M unit mix means ratio magnitudes carry a constant offset and are not comparable to textbook levels.

Replication

How closely this rebuild tracks the published research

Replicable
Open Source Asset Pricing signalBM
Correlation — full sample—
Correlation — test window—

The OSAP comparison is only computed for the all-stocks variant — switch to “All stocks” above to see how the rebuild tracks the published series.

Style tilt

Size × value map of the long leg

58 classified
Value
Blend
Growth
Large
Mid
Small
86%6
·
·
6%11
3%5
·
3%30
1%6
·

Share of long-leg capital by market cap × book-to-market, using terciles of the 421-name universe at July 2026. Rows: Large ≥ $8.9B, Small < $1.9B. Columns: Value ≥ 0.63, Growth < 0.38 B/M. The dot marks the capital-weighted centroid of the book — 91% toward Large, 2% toward Growth. Hypothetical holdings — descriptive, not realized P&L.

Tilt over time
Size tilt91% → Large
SmallLarge
Value ↔ growth tilt2% → Growth
ValueGrowth

Capital-weighted centroid of the long leg, December 1999 → July 2026; the right-hand end is the same value as the box’s dot. 58 names now. Hypothetical holdings — descriptive, not P&L.

Since publication

Did the edge survive the paper coming out?

published 1980
Entirely since publication
All 329 months of our record post-date the 1980 paper.
Sharpe 0.317.7% p.a.March 1999 – July 2026

There is no “before” to compare against — the predictor was already public when our data begins, so every month shown is out-of-sample relative to the original study.

Split at January of the year after the factor was published. The post-publication stretch IS genuinely out-of-sample relative to the original study -- the predictor was public by then -- so it speaks to whether the effect survived being known. Nothing is fitted here, so this is performance SINCE PUBLICATION, not validation of a model. Note the 'pre' side is our data before publication (our panel starts ~1999), NOT the study's original in-sample period, which usually ran decades earlier; a decay figure compares before-vs-after within our sample and is not a comparison against the published result.

Derivatives risk (Rule 18f-4)

Relative VaR against the designated reference portfolio — as implemented here

long-short

This assessment describes the research long-short construction — long the top bucket, short the bottom.

Governing rule
Rule 18f-4(c)(2)(i) relative VaR (exception unavailable)

This fund does NOT qualify for the limited-derivatives-user exception (100% of net assets vs <= 10% of net assets), so the relative VaR test governs. Note the inversion: a dollar-neutral long-short book suppresses the market risk the VaR ratio measures and so tends to pass it, while being barred from the exception by construction — what disqualifies the strategy is the exposure threshold, not the risk limit.

Limited derivatives user exceptionby construction

Rule 18f-4(c)(4): a fund whose derivatives exposure (gross notional, including the value of assets sold short) is <= 10% of net assets is excepted from the VaR tests and the full derivatives risk management program.

Does not qualify
Required
<= 10% of net assets
Exposure
100% of net assets
Margin
−90pp

No confidence interval: this follows from portfolio construction, not from an estimate.

Rule 18f-4(c)(2)(i): fund VaR at 99% over 20 trading days must not exceed 200% of the designated reference portfolio's VaR on the same basis.

Within the limit as implemented
Measured
1.4 (95% CI 0.9-1.9)
x reference VaR
Limit
2.00x
<= 2.00x reference VaR
Fund VaR
13.6%
99% / 20d
Reference
9.6%
FF5 market (mkt)

historical method · 329 monthly observations · about 3.3 in the 99% tail · paired percentile bootstrap over months

Same test, three estimators
historical
1.42x
within
parametric
1.61x
within
cornish fisher
2.17x
over · unreliable

The estimators agree, which is mild evidence the number isn’t an artefact of one method.

Engineering approximation of SEC Rule 18f-4 for research display. Not a compliance opinion and not a determination that any fund is compliant. Hypothetical model portfolio, not a registered fund.

Consistency across eras

Is this record broadly durable, or one regime?

26 windows
Positive windows
50%
13 of 26 3-year windows made money
Worst window
-1.71
Sharpe, March 2006 – February 2009
March 1999July 2026
Median Sharpe
0.04
Dispersion
0.73
Best window
1.52

3-year rolling windows, stepping 1 year (26 windows). Dispersion is the spread of window Sharpes — higher means the record depends more on which era you look at.

Rules-based factors fit no parameters, so these windows are not out-of-sample tests and do not validate a fitted model. They show whether the factor's record is consistent across eras or driven by one regime.

Returns

Long-short is the research line; the long leg is what a long-only fund could hold

since March 1999
Trailing
PeriodLong-shortLong leg
1 yearcum.147.4%194.0%
3 yearsp.a.21.0%47.7%
5 yearsp.a.3.2%23.5%
10 yearsp.a.0.3%24.4%
Since inceptionp.a.5.0%15.0%
Calendar years
YearLong-shortLong leg
20267 mo69.9%85.8%
202564.5%90.6%
2024-48.0%-27.2%
20231.5%74.7%
2022-5.7%-38.1%
2021-14.4%14.4%
2020-11.5%34.2%
20195.7%39.0%
2018-25.1%-10.6%
20176.8%44.1%
201616.1%26.0%
2015-17.6%-18.5%
20146.2%17.5%
201335.6%65.8%
2012-8.7%9.3%
2011-5.9%-14.2%
20107.1%23.2%
200918.6%89.9%
2008-23.0%-54.2%
2007-22.4%-10.0%
2006-8.0%6.4%
20056.3%-0.2%
20042.1%14.9%
200342.5%79.8%
20022.6%-35.4%
200181.9%3.1%
200060.1%3.3%
199910 mo11.3%122.9%

Long-short is the research line (long the top bucket, short the bottom); the long leg alone is what a long-only fund could actually hold. Trailing figures run through July 2026: 1 year is a plain cumulative 12-month return (cum.), 3 years and longer are annualised (p.a.). Years marked with a month count are partial. These match the fact sheet’s tables by construction. Hypothetical backtest, gross of the placeholder expense ratio and trading costs — not investor results.

Methodology

Signal computed monthly from Sharadar point-in-time data, signed so higher = higher expected return. Restricted to the Technology sector, then sorted into quintiles within that sector. The virtual ETF is long the top bucket, short the bottom, cap-weighted, rebalanced monthly. FF5 alpha regresses the long-short on the Fama-French 5 factors.

Hypothetical research backtest. Not an offer, recommendation, or investment advice.