What it measures

Standard deviation of turnover (vol/shrout) over the past 36 months.

Why it should work

Liquidity: less-liquid stocks have historically earned a liquidity premium.

Full Sharpe
-0.10
Ann. Return (LS)
-2.4%
Ann. Volatility
23.6%
Max Drawdown
-81.4%

Growth of $1 — long-short

Energy only · cap-weighted · 331 months

Energy only
Where the edge comes from
Long leg Sharpe
0.59
top bucket, long-only
Long leg ann. return
11.9%
the buyable side
Bottom bucket Sharpe
0.40
the basket we short
Bottom bucket ann. return
14.3%
lower ⇒ wider spread

The bottom-bucket figures are that basket’s ownreturn (a long position in what the strategy shorts) — not the short side’s P&L. Long-short return = long leg − bottom bucket, so a falling bottom bucket widens the spread.

Performance by period
train
val
test
Sharpe by split
Train ’00–’12-0.01
Val ’13–’180.26
Test ’19–’26-0.30
Test FF5 α (ann.)
-1.4%
alpha vs Fama-French 5
Test FF5 α t-stat
-0.18
not significant
Monthly turnover
10%
of the long leg, per rebalance

Source study

Chordia, Subra, Anshuman · 2001

Journal of Financial Economics

1,349 citations
View on Google Scholar

Worked example

Live inputs for a real holding

AAPL · July 2026
InputValue
Formula
Raw0.0016Signed (×−1)-0.0016

signed_value is the internal ranking value; only its cross-sectional rank matters. $-vs-$M unit mix means ratio magnitudes carry a constant offset and are not comparable to textbook levels.

Replication

How closely this rebuild tracks the published research

Replicable
Open Source Asset Pricing signalstd_turn
Correlation — full sample—
Correlation — test window—
Published t-stat3.74

The OSAP comparison is only computed for the all-stocks variant — switch to “All stocks” above to see how the rebuild tracks the published series.

Style tilt

Size × value map of the long leg

27 classified
Value
Blend
Growth
Large
Mid
Small
·
77%6
19%4
<1%1
1%3
1%3
<1%2
<1%4
<1%3

Share of long-leg capital by market cap × book-to-market, using terciles of the 137-name universe at July 2026. Rows: Large ≥ $7.1B, Small < $1.8B. Columns: Value ≥ 0.64, Growth < 0.40 B/M. The dot marks the capital-weighted centroid of the book — 98% toward Large, 60% toward Growth. Hypothetical holdings — descriptive, not realized P&L.

Tilt over time
Size tilt98% → Large
SmallLarge
Value ↔ growth tilt60% → Growth
ValueGrowth

Capital-weighted centroid of the long leg, December 1998 → July 2026; the right-hand end is the same value as the box’s dot. 27 names now. Hypothetical holdings — descriptive, not P&L.

Since publication

Did the edge survive the paper coming out?

published 2001
Before publication (pre-2001)
-0.65
Sharpe · -23.1% p.a.
January 1999 – December 2001 · 36 mo
Since publication
0.01
Sharpe · 0.1% p.a.
January 2002 – July 2026 · 295 mo
Change in Sharpe+0.66the return flipped from negative to positive since publication

Split at January of the year after the factor was published. The post-publication stretch IS genuinely out-of-sample relative to the original study -- the predictor was public by then -- so it speaks to whether the effect survived being known. Nothing is fitted here, so this is performance SINCE PUBLICATION, not validation of a model. Note the 'pre' side is our data before publication (our panel starts ~1999), NOT the study's original in-sample period, which usually ran decades earlier; a decay figure compares before-vs-after within our sample and is not a comparison against the published result.

Derivatives risk (Rule 18f-4)

Relative VaR against the designated reference portfolio — as implemented here

long-short

This assessment describes the research long-short construction — long the top bucket, short the bottom.

Governing rule
Rule 18f-4(c)(2)(i) relative VaR (exception unavailable)

This fund does NOT qualify for the limited-derivatives-user exception (100% of net assets vs <= 10% of net assets), so the relative VaR test governs. Note the inversion: a dollar-neutral long-short book suppresses the market risk the VaR ratio measures and so tends to pass it, while being barred from the exception by construction — what disqualifies the strategy is the exposure threshold, not the risk limit.

Limited derivatives user exceptionby construction

Rule 18f-4(c)(4): a fund whose derivatives exposure (gross notional, including the value of assets sold short) is <= 10% of net assets is excepted from the VaR tests and the full derivatives risk management program.

Does not qualify
Required
<= 10% of net assets
Exposure
100% of net assets
Margin
−90pp

No confidence interval: this follows from portfolio construction, not from an estimate.

Rule 18f-4(c)(2)(i): fund VaR at 99% over 20 trading days must not exceed 200% of the designated reference portfolio's VaR on the same basis.

Not settled by the data
Measured
2.3 (95% CI 1.3-2.9)
x reference VaR
Limit
2.00x
<= 2.00x reference VaR
Fund VaR
22.6%
99% / 20d
Reference
9.6%
FF5 market (mkt)

The interval spans the limit. The point estimate is 2.34x but the 95% interval runs 1.27–2.92x, which includes 2.00x. This test does not settle which side of the line the fund is on.

historical method · 331 monthly observations · about 3.3 in the 99% tail · paired percentile bootstrap over months

Same test, three estimators
historical
2.34x
over
parametric
1.63x
within
cornish fisher
1.95x
within

The estimators disagree about the verdict, not just the value — the choice of method decides the answer here. Historical VaR gives ratio 2.34 (fail) but Gaussian VaR gives 1.63 (pass). The pass/fail conclusion is an artefact of estimator choice, not a property of the strategy.

Engineering approximation of SEC Rule 18f-4 for research display. Not a compliance opinion and not a determination that any fund is compliant. Hypothetical model portfolio, not a registered fund.

Consistency across eras

Is this record broadly durable, or one regime?

26 windows
Positive windows
58%
15 of 26 3-year windows made money
Worst window
-0.89
Sharpe, January 2003 – December 2005
January 1999July 2026
Median Sharpe
0.09
Dispersion
0.44
Best window
0.86

3-year rolling windows, stepping 1 year (26 windows). Dispersion is the spread of window Sharpes — higher means the record depends more on which era you look at.

Rules-based factors fit no parameters, so these windows are not out-of-sample tests and do not validate a fitted model. They show whether the factor's record is consistent across eras or driven by one regime.

Returns

Long-short is the research line; the long leg is what a long-only fund could hold

since January 1999
Trailing
PeriodLong-shortLong leg
1 yearcum.-14.9%32.2%
3 yearsp.a.0.2%14.7%
5 yearsp.a.-2.7%23.4%
10 yearsp.a.-7.0%8.7%
Since inceptionp.a.-5.2%10.3%
Calendar years
YearLong-shortLong leg
20267 mo-10.7%27.5%
20254.1%8.9%
202410.0%13.3%
2023-0.3%-0.1%
2022-1.1%62.6%
2021-28.6%45.9%
2020-37.2%-36.3%
20191.5%6.4%
201810.2%-11.5%
201713.4%-1.4%
2016-34.9%18.8%
201531.5%-18.2%
201418.0%-0.9%
2013-4.2%24.6%
2012-3.2%9.6%
201120.3%14.8%
2010-7.2%29.2%
2009-12.9%35.7%
200852.1%-17.8%
2007-11.8%22.7%
200618.8%32.8%
2005-23.7%14.9%
2004-6.7%28.4%
2003-5.8%21.8%
20022.7%-9.0%
200114.3%-2.4%
2000-43.4%8.8%
1999-37.8%8.5%

Long-short is the research line (long the top bucket, short the bottom); the long leg alone is what a long-only fund could actually hold. Trailing figures run through July 2026: 1 year is a plain cumulative 12-month return (cum.), 3 years and longer are annualised (p.a.). Years marked with a month count are partial. These match the fact sheet’s tables by construction. Hypothetical backtest, gross of the placeholder expense ratio and trading costs — not investor results.

Methodology

Signal computed monthly from Sharadar point-in-time data, signed so higher = higher expected return. Restricted to the Energy sector, then sorted into quintiles within that sector. The virtual ETF is long the top bucket, short the bottom, cap-weighted, rebalanced monthly. FF5 alpha regresses the long-short on the Fama-French 5 factors.

Hypothetical research backtest. Not an offer, recommendation, or investment advice.